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resources, and various water conservation techniques.
The ninth chapter, RepresentativeSettlements and Settlement Efforts,
focuses on "a series of settlements and settlement efforts ...

that

represent various conditions and solutions." Essentially, the authors
utilize the information presented in the preceding eight chapters and
explain it in a sequence of examples involving water rights litigation.
For example, the Wind River Litigation (1992) is a decades-long
litigation involving Wind River and the Shoshone Indian tribe in
Wyoming. In addition, the Ak-Chin Water Settlement (1978) concerned
the water -rights of the Pima and Papago Indians of Arizona, and
involved strong Congressional help and leadership from Arizona
representative John Rhodes.
Finally, the tenth chapter, Conclusion,ends the book by re-examining
the plight of American Indians and their water rights. The authors offer
a series of suggestions on how we can achieve a quicker progress
regarding the settlement of Indian water rights claims. For example,
Congress can do more to promote progress and equity, tribes and states
can aspire to more consistent leadership, and parties should more
frequently use mediation techniques in lieu of expensive and timeconsuming litigation.
Negotiating Tribal Water Rights: Fulfilling Promises in the Arid West
is an extremely useful study of the current status of water rights
negotiations in the western United States. The book reads with
sufficient narrative, flavor, and personality to keep most legal readers
interested and informed. The analyses of the legal history as well as the
manifold aspects of the negotiation and settlement processes would be
of particular interest to anyone involved in water rights litigation in the
western United States.
Ethan Ice
Robin Kundis Craig, The Clean Water Act and the Constitution:
Legal Structure and the Public's Right to a Clean and Healthy
Environment, ELI Press (2d Ed. 2009); 308 pp; $50.00; ISBN 978-158576-138-8; soft cover.
Professor Robin Kundis Craig excellently describes the development
of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), the CWA's constitutional implications,
and whether the right to clean water is a constitutional right. Professor
Craig is the Attorney's Title Insurance Fund Professor of Law and CoDirector of the Environmental and Land Use Law Program at the Florida
State University College of Law. She specializes in the CWA, coastal
water pollution, the intersection of water and land issues, marine
biodiversity and protected areas, water law, and climate change.
In the Second Edition of this book, Professor Craig addresses the
CWA and the Constitution in three parts. First, she describes the
development of federal regulation and enforcement of water quality.
This includes implications on the Supremacy Clause, federalism and
comity among states, sovereign immunity, commerce, and takings.
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Second, she addresses the less traditional aspects of Constitutional law
and discusses citizen enforcement of federal laws. Third, she concludes
by evaluating whether there should be a constitutional right to clean
water.
Part One of the book begins with a concise history of the CWA. In
Chapter One, the author notes that although Congress easily decided
that cleaning up the nation's waters was a national priority, this task
was not easily accomplished when left entirely to the states. Professor
Craig divides the history of the Act into two distinct phases: the pre1972 Amendments and post-1972 developments. In a summary of the
years prior to 1972, Professor Craig highlights the inadequacy of stateonly enforcement. Beginning with Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act ("RHA"), also known as the Refuse Act, Congress first addressed
pollution of the navigable waters of the United States. As the navigable
waters became evermore polluted, the United States began aggressively
enforcing an expanding number of categories. The Supreme Court
decision in United States v. Republic Steel Corporationconfirmed that the
Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") had broad authority to enforce
violations under the RHA.
Turning from the RHA, Professor Craig chronicles the development
of the CWA from the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA")
forward. In 1948, Congress first recognized the importance of federal
involvement in water pollution control. However, concerns about
federalism caused Congress to accept a supplementary role to the states
in water quality regulation. The need for subsequent amendments to
the FWPCA demonstrates the failure of this policy. The FWPCA
Extension of 1952 gave additional grants to state and local governments
to improve water quality and reaffirmed state primacy in water quality
regulation. Amending the Act in 1956, Congress recognized for the first
time that water quality is a national concern. Importantly, the
amendments allowed the federal courts to resolve interstate water
pollution issues, albeit in limited scope.
By 1961, Congress began to recognize the failure of the states to
manage water quality. The FWPCA Amendments of 1961 enhanced
many of the programs under the FWPCA but also changed the federal
role. The amendments transferred the enforcement authority from the
Surgeon General to the -Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,
expanded federal research, and increased the number of waters
regulated under the Act. They also acknowledged that water pollution is
more than just a local or state problem. The Water Quality Act of 1965
formally recognized water quality as a national problem and introduced
federal quality standards to the Act. The standards ensured that
someone, preferably the states, would pursue water quality standards.
The 1966 Amendments expanded the water quality standards program
by enticing states with federal grants.
Despite the many changes and amendments to the Act, by 1970 the
nation's waters had not improved. Professor Craig points to the Torrey
Canyon disaster, and not the Cuyahoga River fire, as the driving force
behind the changes in 1970. Following the 1970 Amendments,
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President Nixon ordered the newly established Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") and the Corps to implement a permit
program under the RHA. For the next two years, the states were still
primarily responsible for water quality management.
The FWPCA Amendments of 1972 dramatically altered the balance
between state and federal responsibility. First, the amendments
adopted the cooperative federalism approach by creating minimum
federal standards that the states must adopt as floors or the states
would face have the federal law preempt their own. Second, the
amendments drastically altered the enforcement relationship between
the federal enforcers and individual polluters by establishing the EPA
and Corps as the permitting and enforcement agencies.
In total, these amendments created the cooperative federalism we
now rely upon in the CWA. States have retained their responsibility to
ensure waters within their borders meet the federal water quality
standards under the Total Maximum Daily Load ("TMDL") requirement.
While EPA and the Corps respectively had the authority to administer
the Section 402 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") Permit Program and the Section 404 Dredge and Fill Permit
Program, most states have now taken over NPDES permitting authority
while only two have taken over Section 404 permitting authority.
Chapter Two examines the constitutional implications of the federal
enforcement of a traditional state power. Regardless of the CWA's
embodiment of cooperative federalism, the CWA is still a federal statute
that benefits from the Supremacy Clause. As such, it preempts state law
where: (1) the federal interest dominates; (2) Congress specifically
preempted state law; or (3) Congress impliedly preempted state law.
Given the enormity of the CWA, it would appear at first blush that
Congress has enacted a comprehensive statute regulating all water
quality control activities, thereby occupying the field. However, savings
clauses allow states to regulate water quantity and delivery and all
states are free to enact stricter regulations. While states have the ability
to take over many of the responsibilities of the CWA, the federal
standards are constantly in play. If state standards fall below the
Federal standards, EPA or the Corps may take over any authority
previously granted to the states. In the cooperative model, the federal
standards are always the floor and if the state standards fall below that
floor, the federal standards preempt state law.
Chapter Three discusses interstate water pollution. Professor Craig
places the CWA regulation of interstate water pollution in the context of
the Supreme Court's continued and increasing unwillingness to exercise
original jurisdiction under its Article III powers. Prior to 1972,
resolving interstate water pollution issues was a difficult task and
Congress was acutely aware of these problems. Section 401 of the CWA
requires the EPA to consider interstate pollution and allow downstream
states to object to NPDES permits. However, as noted before, most
states have taken over NPDES permitting and limited the effectiveness
of Section 401. As part of assuming NPDES permitting, the states must
notify downstream states of potential impacts to water quality and give
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that state an opportunity to comment on any permit. Further, EPA can
veto a permit or reassume control of all permitting.
One of the most significant examples of preemption arose under the
context preemption of federal common law, not state law. Prior to the
CWA, the federal common law of nuisance governed interstate water
pollution issues. However, in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, the Supreme
Court held that federal common law is subject to the paramount
authority of Congress and that the CWA occupied the field of federal
common law by establishing a comprehensive regulatory scheme
supervised by an expert administrative agency.
Given that states have taken over the NPDES permitting process, it is
inevitable that states may end up regulating federal and tribal facilities.
In Chapter Four, Professor Craig describes this novel inversion of the
regulatory hierarchy, an important aspect of improving water quality
since federal facilities contribute greatly to the problem. The real issue
with this regulatory hierarchy becomes enforcement. In all cases, the
Supreme Court strictly construed the waiver of sovereign immunity in
Section 313 of the CWA.
In California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board v. EPA
("California II"), the Supreme Court held that Congress had not explicitly
waived sovereign immunity and therefore federal dischargers did not
need to obtain state NPDES permit. After the California II decision,
Congress accepted the Court's invitation to make a broad waiver of
sovereign immunity and amended Section 313 of the CWA. While the
amendments were broad, the Supreme Court held in Department of
Energy v. Ohio that the waiver of sovereign immunity did not subject
federal facilities to punitive penalties. Taken on its face, this does not
seem to be a major issue since civil penalties are payable to federal
government; however, contrasting federal facility compliance in the
CWA versus said compliance in the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act ("RCRA") illustrates the effect. Facilities overwhelmingly
comply with RCRA, a law that does allow civil penalties against federal
violators. Federal facility compliance with the CWA, however, leaves
something be desired.
Additionally, where state water quality
standards conflict with other federal goals, such as energy production
and navigation, courts have favored the federal goal.
With respect to tribal sovereign immunity, Congress may waive
sovereign immunity to permit state regulation and this modern trend
has allowed state regulation on tribal lands. However, both Congress
and the Supreme Court have shown more respect for tribal authority in
recent years. In most cases, the state regulatory authority will depend
on the unique history of the relationship of the state, tribe, and federal
governments.
Chapter Five provides a detailed and thorough explanation of the
application of the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the
term "Navigable Waters." The chapter covers a broad explanation of the
Commerce Clause in non-CWA jurisprudence, then applies that analysis
to the CWA. Importantly, the chapter describes in detail the changing
meaning of "Navigable Waters" throughout case law. Professor Craig
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illustrates the problems that this jurisprudence has created with respect
to isolated or unconnected water bodies. She also points out that
Congress may fix this problem by amending the CWA to include a clear
provision that Navigable Waters extends to the limits of the Commerce
Clause.
Next, Professor Craig discusses the potential for takings under the
CWA. The lesson from Chapter Six is simple: the CWA does not have a
large potential for takings under NPDES permitting, but a Section 404
permit denial may affect a taking. A Corps denial of a Section 404
permit may affect a taking where it limits development. Section 404
permitting defines what constitutes a regulatory taking that is deserving
of compensation. However, the CWA takings jurisprudence is limited
and much of the analysis will be the same as it would be under any
takings claim.
The Second Section of the book focuses on the creation of citizen
suits in the various environmental laws enacted since the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"). In Chapter Seven, Professor Craig
discusses the mechanisms and statutory requirements to bring a citizen
suit under the CWA. While public participation is an important aspect of
permitting and rulemakings, the most important development in citizen
enforcement is the citizen suit. Section 505 of the CWA allows any
citizen to bring a suit againist any person, including government entities,
who is alleged to be in violation of an effluent standard or limitation
under the CWA. Additionally, a citizen may bring suit against the EPA
for failure to perform any act or duty of the CWA. One significant caveat
of the citizen suit is that the plaintiff must prove an ongoing violation,
which disallows suits for violations that are wholly in the past. Further,
diligent prosecution by a government entity forecloses a citizen suit.
Chapter Eight describes the constitutional requirements to bringing
a citizen suit, with a keen eye on the Article III standing requirements.
Professor Craig first covers the development of the "case or
controversy" requirements. She then visits the familiar requirements
for standing developed in case law.
Chapter Nine revisits the question of waiver of sovereign immunity,
this time in context of citizen suits. As Section 313 of the CWA waives
sovereign immunity for state enforcement, Section 505 does the same
for citizen suits. While Section 505 on its face waives immunity for
suits, it is not clear whether it allows citizen suits to pursue civil
penalties. The Circuits are split on whether Section 505 waives
sovereign immunity from civil penalties. However, the Court's decision
in Department of Energy v. Ohio may have foreclosed any possibility.
This holding does not, however, extend to tribes despite their special
quasi-sovereign status. Despite not being subject to TMDL and NPDES
regulations, tribes are subject to citizen suits. It is clear, on the other
hand, that Section 505 waives sovereign immunity for failure to act
under mandatory duties.
Chapter Ten visits the implications of the Eleventh Amendment on
citizen suits. The Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida decision made it
clear that the Congress does not generally have the right to abrogate
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state sovereign immunity except pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment. As a result, citizen suits against states have been sparse
and the jurisprudence is unclear as to whether the CWA may waive
sovereign immunity.
Chapter Eleven looks at the Article II Separation of Powers issues
raised by entitling citizens to fulfill an Executive power. Professor Craig
adeptly points out that Article III standing ensures that the actions of a
defendant must harm a plaintiff, and therefore the enforcement is of a
civil and not criminal nature. The Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife decision
made it clear that citizen suits were a different nature and character
than a private enforcement of public interests. However, private actions
do raise important separation of powers issues. Because citizen suits
effectively create a private right of enforcement, the Article III standing
analysis is of utmost importance. Without satisfying standing, a
congressionally enacted statute transfers enforcement authority
reserved for the executive to private citizens.
The final chapter of the book discusses the successes of the CWA,
chronicling major improvements in water quality since 1972. The
success of citizen suits seems to suggest that there may be a
constitutional right to clean water and a pollution-free environment.
Professor Craig seems to suggest that that there is not a lot of support in
the Constitution, but that an amendment may be appropriate.
The Clean Water Act and the Constitution is a well-written, concise,
and interesting description of the CWA. The first section of the book
excellently describes the development of the CWA, while the second
section focuses primarily on constitutional implications and citizen
suits. The book is an excellent read and an enjoyable introduction to the
CWA. While it serves as a must read for anyone interested in
environmental protection, not }ust water, it would also be an excellent
addition to a Constitutional Law course.
Dan Vedra

